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How Much Do We Understand about
the Modern Recession?
MODERN RECESSIONS HIT THE U.S. economy in 1990–91 and in 2001. A
modern recession is one occurring in an economy with well-executed mon-
etary policy and a small fraction of the labor force on the factory ﬂoor. I
review the facts about modern recessions and compare them with earlier
recessions, with primary emphasis on the labor market. The facts are per-
plexing: employment falls in modern recessions at least as far as in past
recessions, without identiﬁable driving forces. Economists’ understand-
ing of the modern causeless recession is at an early stage, but progress has
occurred and the future of this area of research seems promising.
Facts about Modern and Earlier Recessions
The ﬁrst important fact about modern recessions is that they are about as
severe when measured in employment losses as earlier ones, leaving aside
the Great Depression. Figure 1 shows deviations of total employment from
its trend since 1948, and table 1 shows the percentage decline in employ-
ment associated with each of the ten recessions of the past sixty years.
(The identiﬁcation of recessions follows the standard chronology as deter-
mined by the National Bureau of Economic Research Business Cycle Dating
Committee, but the dates are for the peaks and troughs in detrended employ-
ment, not the National Bureau’s dates for peaks and troughs in economic
activity.) The two modern recessions rank second and sixth in employment
decline. Plainly the “Great Moderation”—the broad reduction in economic
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Table 1. Employment Declines Associated with Post-World War II Recessions
a
Previous peak in  Trough in detrended  Decline in











Source: Author’s calculations from data in ﬁgure 1.
a. Recessions are those identiﬁed by the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Business Cycle Dating Committee. Number
following colon indicates month. Shading indicates modern recessions. See ﬁgure 1 for an explanation of the detrending method.
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Source: Author’s calculations using Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
a. Data are monthly. Deviations are the residuals from a regression of log employment on a cubic polynomial in time.
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is that productivity does not decline as it did in earlier ones.
The Great Moderation deﬁnitely applies to GDP, whose volatility has
fallen by half in the past two decades compared with the two preceding
decades. By some measures, such as the standard deviation of year-to-year
changes in employment, the volatility of employment also has declined,
but not as much. But the key fact is that modern recessions have involved
lengthy periods of below-trend employment growth, and so a metric that
captures these lengthy periods, such as that in table 1, reveals that employ-
ment volatility has not declined at all. Of course, this statement is based
on a sample size of two. The next recession could easily have a small and
brief decline in employment.
The second important fact is that the decline in employment and rise
in unemployment associated with a modern recession occur without any
important increase in job loss. Figure 2 shows the layoff rate reported by
employers in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), which
began in December 2000, just in time to catch the 2001 recession. Apart
from a spike at 9/11, layoffs remained quite constant until they began 
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10922-03a_Hall_REV.qxd  1/25/08  11:09 AM  Page 15to decline moderately in late 2005. This picture of the 2001 recession is
conﬁrmed by a long time series constructed by Robert Shimer for the exit
rate from employment, that is, the rate of departure from employment into
unemployment or out of the labor force (ﬁgure 3). Shimer’s series actually
declines fairly steadily over the entire period since the early 1980s, with
no visible reversal during the 2001 recession. This illustrates the third impor-
tant fact: unemployment rises in a modern recession because new jobs are
hard to ﬁnd, not because workers have lost jobs. In a recession, the ﬂow of
workers out of jobs remains about the same, and so does the ﬂow of workers
back into jobs. But a much larger pool of unemployed develops because
jobs are hard to ﬁnd. The rate at which the unemployed ﬁnd jobs falls in the
same proportion that the stock of unemployed rises, resulting in a constant
ﬂow from unemployment into new jobs.
Figure 3 shows that earlier recessions did generate spikes of job loss.
In those recessions, unemployment rose both because workers lost jobs more
frequently and because the unemployed found it harder to land new jobs.
The spikes of job loss were brief, so that unemployment rebounded more
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Source: Robert Shimer, University of Chicago. For additional details see Shimer (2007) and his webpage robert.shimer. 
googlepages.com/flows.
a. Data are quarterly averages of monthly rates of exit from employment.
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manufacturing were an important factor in these spikes.
Figure 4 shows the job-ﬁnding rate for the unemployed, also calculated
by Shimer. In the 1990–91 and 2001 recessions, the same dramatic fall in
the monthly likelihood of ﬁnding new work occurred as in the recessions
of earlier decades.
Another dimension of the softening of the labor market in recessions is
in the recruiting efforts of employers, as measured by help-wanted advertis-
ing. Figure 5 shows that help-wanted ads collapse in every recession, but
did so especially sharply in the two modern recessions. The 2001 recession,
although not severe by the standard of employment decline, saw the largest
fall ever in help-wanted ads. The decline may have been exaggerated by a
shift toward Internet recruiting, as the further decline during the recovery sug-
gests. The Conference Board, which collects these data, has recently begun to
gather data on online job listings but has not yet produced a combined index.
In the modern recession, as in earlier ones, all sectors of the labor market
slacken at the same time. Figure 6 illustrates this fact in terms of job openings
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Figure 4. Average Monthly Hires from Unemployment, 1948Q1–2007Q1
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Figure 5. Monthly Index of Help-Wanted Advertising, 1951–2006
Figure 6. Monthly Vacancy Rates by Sector, 2000–07
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even including government—was recruiting to ﬁll far fewer positions at the
trough of the recession than at the previous peak. The softening of the labor
market was economy-wide, not restricted to recession-prone sectors such
as durables. Katharine Abraham and Lawrence Katz were the ﬁrst to recog-
nize the signiﬁcance of this feature of the economy,
1 which rules out theories
of recession that rest on reallocation from shrinking to expanding sectors.
If unemployment in a recession were the natural, efﬁcient result of
reallocation of workers from shrinking to growing sectors, the growing
sectors would be seen opening their doors wide to absorb the ﬂow of
workers leaving the shrinking sectors. Vacancies would be high in the
growing sectors and low in the shrinking ones. Figure 6 refutes that view
for the most recent recession. Some common force was making all sectors
cut back their recruiting. Later I will discuss the idea that sticky prices
and wages could explain these facts. I ﬁnd that they could, but that the tra-
ditional way of thinking about stickiness is theoretically unsatisfying and
is in the process of being replaced by a new line of thought.
Driving Forces
What exogenous forces cause recessions? Three forces are prominent in
the accounts of the various schools of macroeconomic thought: productivity,
government purchases, and monetary shocks.
I have shown elsewhere that the appropriate measure of productivity
from the perspective of the labor market is the average product of labor,
which moves in proportion to the marginal product of labor under con-
stant returns to scale.
2 Figure 7 plots detrended productivity since 1948. It
shows that although productivity did decline in earlier recessions, the two
modern recessions occurred without any contribution from that source.
Given that ﬁnding, it is unnecessary to enter the debate over whether the
earlier productivity declines were the cause or the effect of the recessions
that accompanied them.
Figure 8 shows detrended government purchases. The 1990–91 recession
occurred during a period of unusually rapid decline in these purchases—
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a. Series is detrended by dividing by a constant growth factor that equalizes the beginning and ending values at 100.
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, table 1.1.6.
a. Data are quarterly. Series is detrended by dividing by a constant growth factor that equalizes the beginning and ending values 
at 100.
Figure 7. Detrended Output per Worker, 1948–2007
a
Figure 8. Detrended Real Government Purchases, 1948–2007
a
10922-03a_Hall_REV.qxd  1/25/08  11:09 AM  Page 20as did the 1970–71 recession. But purchases rose slightly more than normal
in 2001. Fluctuations in government purchases do not seem to play much
of a role in the story of recessions.
The two modern recessions occurred in the setting of fully modern
monetary policymaking. In that setting the central bank responds to outside
inﬂuences, with the objective of keeping inﬂation low in the longer run
and offsetting booms and recessions in the shorter run—monetary policy
is not a source of disturbances to the economy. Figure 9, which plots the
interest rate on federal funds since 1954, illustrates the change in monetary
policymaking that separated the last of the earlier recessions, in 1981–82,
from the two modern recessions. Here the most noticeable change is the
huge reduction in the volatility of the funds rate. But timing differences
are important as well. Under modern policy the Federal Reserve cuts the
rate aggressively as soon as a recession is apparent. Under the old policy
the Federal Reserve not only caused the recession by raising the rate to
extreme levels, but held it high during the recession. This behavior was
most prominent in the 1973–75 and 1981–82 recessions. Although mone-
tary policy can be a causal factor in recessions, and apparently was in the
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Figure 9. Federal Funds Interest Rate, 1954–2007
a
10922-03a_Hall_REV.qxd  1/25/08  11:09 AM  Page 211980s and before, it is hard to see how monetary policy could have caused
either of the modern recessions.
John Cochrane argued similarly long before the second modern recession.
He assigned virtually all responsibility for recessions to what one might
call “mystery shocks,” after reviewing the standard candidates.
3 Sometimes
the mystery shocks have names. For example, many observers blame the
1990–91 recession on the savings and loan crisis, and the 2001 recession
on the collapse of technology spending when the technology bubble broke
in 2000.
The primary defect with this class of explanations is their failure to
explain the Abraham-Katz phenomenon. If housing fell in 1990–91 because
of ﬁnancial constraints stemming from the savings and loan failures, but all
other sectors were unaffected, it is hard to see why all the other sectors’
labor markets turned so slack. The focus of the technology sector collapse
was even narrower. Why didn’t the winning sectors expand to absorb the
workers released by the single losing sector in each of the two modern
recessions?
A traditional answer to this question is that the wage-price system fails
to send the right signals to consumers, workers, and ﬁrms to expand the
unaffected sectors. One view is that real wages are sticky and thus remain
too high to yield ﬁrms in the other sectors high enough proﬁts to expand.
Another is that prices are sticky and remain too high to result in full
employment because the central bank keeps the interest rate too high for
any expansion to occur. Recent models combine both views. The recent
paper by Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans is
a leading example of modern research in this vein.
4
Sticky wages and prices are not a full explanation, however, because they
lack a deep rationalization. A sticky wage that keeps employment below a
mutually desirable level creates an opportunity for a worker and an employer
to make a Pareto improvement for themselves by adjusting employment
upward. What happens to the wage is immaterial here—what matters is
the increase in employment. The same holds when a sticky price keeps
the quantity of goods traded below its efﬁcient level. The traditional sticky-
price literature has not come to grips with the obvious tools that employers,
workers, sellers, and customers possess to overcome inefficiently low
22 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
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Departures from equilibrium are an assertion, not a derived conclusion
from fundamentals. Traditional sticky-wage and sticky-price theory has a
strong descriptive claim but not a strong theoretical underpinning.
The Modern Economics of Job Creation
The 1994 paper by Dale Mortensen and Christopher Pissarides is the
canon of the modern theory of job creation in a frictional labor market.
5
Pissarides later provided a more complete book-length treatment of the
subject, before the recent explosion of new thinking.6 The Mortensen-
Pissarides paper brought unemployment back into formal macroeconomics.
The labor market in their model describes unemployment in a way that
rings true. People grope around trying to ﬁnd jobs that ﬁt, and the process
takes time and information ﬂows are limited. The model improves on tra-
ditional sticky-wage treatments of the labor market by invoking a full equi-
librium, devoid of any opportunities for bilateral Pareto improvements by
a worker-employer pair.
The Mortensen-Pissarides model also ﬁts the facts about modern ﬂuctu-
ations, in the sense that it focuses mainly on job creation rather than job loss.
The incentive for job creation is the margin between the productivity of a new
worker and the wage to be paid to that worker, both as present values over
the duration of the worker’s employment with the ﬁrm. Employers expend
recruiting resources—running ads, paying posting fees at Monster.com,
interviewing applicants, and the like—up to the point that the resources
needed to add one worker to the payroll absorb the entire present value of
the productivity-wage margin. The model describes an equilibrium in the
market for new hires.
The model also describes an equilibrium with respect to the termination
of employment. Workers do not lose jobs because their wages are too high.
They lose or leave jobs only if their opportunity cost in the market at large
exceeds their productivity in their current job. This equilibrium property
is probably the most important difference between the modern macro-
economic view of unemployment, as embodied in the Mortensen-Pissarides
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cuts that would have saved their jobs. Jobs are automatically saved in the
Mortensen-Pissarides model exactly when they are worth saving—job
separations are efﬁcient.
In October 1969—the month, it so happens, that I was recruited as a
member of the Brookings Panel—the paper by Robert Lucas and Leonard
Rapping appeared that launched the equilibrium school of employment
ﬂuctuations.
7 Although the proposition that markets achieve equilibrium—
in the sense that pairs of actual or potential transactors cannot alter the terms
of their transaction to their mutual advantage—is virtually the deﬁning
concept of economic science, the Lucas-Rapping story, that movements
in employment are along a labor supply curve and that unemployment can
be lumped with leisure, was at best at the borderline of plausibility. The
enhancement of the story in the real business cycle model and its progeny
never persuaded even the more sympathetic of its critics (such as me). The
essential problem was that every version of the equilibrium story invoked
a far higher elasticity of labor supply than could ever be found in the
micro data.
The Mortensen-Pissarides model, in contrast, holds out the tantalizing
possibility of an equilibrium theory without excessively elastic labor supply.
The question that we have been wrestling with since 2002, when Shimer ﬁrst
circulated his paper that would later appear in the American Economic
Review,
8 is whether some variant of the model can generate cyclical ﬂuc-
tuations of the magnitude found in the U.S. economy. Shimer showed that
the original Mortensen-Pissarides model could not come close. Dozens of
subsequent papers have introduced alterations in the model to boost its
response to the driving forces so as to generate realistic unemployment
volatility.
Mortensen and Pissarides followed John Nash in taking the division
of the surplus as a fixed parameter. That assumption turned out to doom
their model to failure as far as unemployment volatility is concerned. If
one abandons this assumption, their model has the potential to generate
lots of volatility. With realistic choices of its parameters, it turns out that
a relatively small decline in productivity relative to the wage causes a
substantial reduction in recruiting effort, making it much harder for workers
24 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
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unchanging over the cycle—requires a much larger stock of unemployed
to generate an equal flow from unemployment to work. The reluctance
of employers to hire any given job seeker is offset by the greater number
of job seekers.
Not surprisingly, a lot of the new research has focused on wage deter-
mination. In a sense, the wage is indeterminate within a speciﬁed range in
the Mortensen-Pissarides model. The indeterminacy arises in any model
where potential transactors meet each other at random, in pairs, rather than
gathering in a central market where they can participate in an auction. An
employer and a worker, having met at random, face the situation described
by an Edgeworth box. If a bargain is available that beneﬁts both sides,
there is a contract curve showing the possible levels of compensation that
split the joint surplus. But no fundamental theory exists to show how the
parties make their bargain along the contract curve.
John Nash tackled this problem in his second-most-famous paper.
9
Under plausible but not compelling assumptions, the parties pick a division
of the surplus controlled by a parameter reﬂecting their relative bargaining
powers. Researchers in the Mortensen-Pissarides line tend, with one inter-
esting exception that I will take up momentarily, to think of bargaining
power as roughly equally divided between worker and employer.
The choice of the Nash bargain prevents the original Mortensen-
Pissarides model from harnessing this source of unemployment volatility.
It makes the wage so flexible that there is essentially no movement in
the key productivity-wage margin. If productivity falls, so does the wage,
the margin remains the same, and employers recruit with their usual
enthusiasm.
Marcus Hagedorn and Iourii Manovskii spotted a way to overcome the
low unemployment volatility implied by the Mortensen-Pissarides model
with a Nash wage bargain.
10 They assigned low bargaining power to the
worker and at the same time assigned a low desire to work—in other words,
a high opportunity cost of participating in the labor market. The wage is
essentially a weighted average of the opportunity cost and productivity, with
the weight on the latter equal to the worker’s bargaining power, measured
as the worker’s share of the total surplus from the employment relationship.
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controlled more by the opportunity cost and less by productivity. So if
productivity falls, the wage does not fall by as much, the incentive to recruit
falls, the labor market softens, and unemployment rises. Hagedorn and
Manovskii’s model can match the observed volatility of unemployment—
it delivers a true equilibrium account of cyclical ﬂuctuations. But attributing
a high opportunity cost to participation in the labor market is just another
way of saying that labor supply is quite elastic. The elasticity of labor
supply implicit in their model is two or three times higher than is found in
micro studies.
I have been involved in elaborating a couple of alternative solutions
that avoid excessive labor supply elasticity. My 2005 paper drops the Nash
wage bargain, replacing it with a wage rule that stabilizes the wage within
the bargaining set, that is, along the part of the contract curve in the
Edgeworth box that is within the lens formed by the indifference curves
that pass through the points the parties could achieve if they did not make
a bargain.
11 If the normal wage is in the middle of the bargaining set, cor-
responding to equal sharing of the employment surplus, the model avoids
the Hagedorn-Manovskii implication of a high labor supply elasticity. The
cost is that the wage rule is ad hoc. Although the rule satisﬁes the basic
property of equilibrium—the solution lies on the contract curve, inside the
Edgeworth lens—the model provides no guidance about where wage sta-
bilization comes from.
My recent paper with Paul Milgrom offers a less arbitrary theory of equi-
librium sticky wages.
12 We again drop the Nash bargain, this time in favor
of alternating-offer bargaining. We see this as a move toward realism in
how bargaining actually occurs: whereas the Nash bargain just appears as
if by magic, in alternating-offer bargaining one party—we believe usually
the employer—makes an offer and the worker accepts or makes a counter-
offer. The resulting wage bargain is much less sensitive to the worker’s
opportunity cost. Although the bargain is still fairly ﬂexible, it is sufﬁciently
stickier than the Nash bargain to make the model capable of matching the
observed increase in unemployment in a recession.
Taming the excess flexibility of the wage bargain in the original
Mortensen-Pissarides model strikes me as the most promising way to
26 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
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exploring modiﬁcations of the model in other directions, especially adding
on-the-job search to the story. The project of enhancing the Mortensen-
Pissarides model to account for realistic movements in unemployment
faces a huge unmet challenge, however. We have no idea how to gener-
ate a modern recession from the model. Almost all the recent work has
taken productivity fluctuations as the most promising driving force. If
the wage is sticky but productivity rises and falls, the key margin will
fluctuate properly, and the Mortensen-Pissarides setup gives a totally
convincing account of the results in the labor market and the economy
as a whole. But productivity has not fallen in the two modern recessions.
The recession of 2001 in fact occurred during a burst of productivity
growth so rapid that essentially no decline in output occurred even as
employment fell dramatically. So the next step in this promising line of
work is to figure out how the subtle changes that occurred in the econ-
omy in 1990–91 and 2001 translated into diminished incentives all across
the economy to create jobs.
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General Discussion
Benjamin Friedman wondered how economists should judge the role of
monetary policy in causing recessions. When monetary policy responds
to a shock to the economy, that response may trigger another problem to
which monetary policy must then respond. Inﬂation may ultimately end up
outside the central bank’s comfort zone, and monetary policy tightens in
response. Was the resulting recession then “caused” by monetary policy,
or by the original shock, or by one of the intermediate steps in the chain of
events? Friedman gave the example of the recession of the early 1980s: Paul
Volcker did not deliberately set out to create a recession but was responding
to various events, many of them (like the 1979 increase in oil prices) originat-
ing outside the United States, and this chain of events and responses ended
in recession. Thus, monetary policy is an important but somewhat ambiguous
part of the cyclical story.
William Brainard discussed the complexity of the relationships between
ﬁrms and employees. He argued that the models of employer-employee wage
bargaining in the paper, which assume a single employer and a representa-
tive employee engaging in bargaining, ignore the differences between the
marginal and the average worker in a ﬁrm. This simpliﬁcation is less of a
problem if all workers are represented by a completely centralized union, but
this is usually not the case. Brainard suggested that the model’s assumption
was artificial and ignored the constraints imposed by within-firm labor
markets.
William Nordhaus said that he would have liked rigid wages and prices
to be addressed more in the paper, particularly to explain the moderate
decline in the layoff rate since 2005. Another possible explanation for this
decline may be the “Europeanization” of some American institutions: it is
becoming increasingly difficult to lay off workers. Nordhaus also won-
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decline in output volatility. Arithmetically, these phenomena are recon-
ciled by a decline in the cyclicality of productivity, but that decline sug-
gests a reduction in labor market rigidities that appears inconsistent with
the declining layoff rate in recent years.
Lawrence Summers noted that the recessions preceding World War II
were “modern recessions” by Robert Hall’s deﬁnition, because they were
not caused by inﬂation prompting the Federal Reserve to tighten monetary
policy. “Modern” recessions seem to be caused by a more widespread and
unquantiﬁable loss of conﬁdence, which Robert Shiller has written about
elsewhere. Summers suggested that modern and traditional recessions may
have different implications for productivity, which might be a useful way
of categorizing them.
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